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abstract: The technological progress of  devices of  representation and control in both religion 
and law promises to bestow upon their users an increasingly perfected mastery of  the real, 
conceived as a collection of  items on which direct and computable agency can be exerted. 
In the domain of  law, the discourse of  technicians swerves more and more towards an im‑
aginary of  cold revelation, in which the patient accumulation of  data and their quantitative 
treatment lay the ultimate truth of  human nature bare. The contemporary religious dis‑
course too does not escape this ideology. The chapter bears on the genesis of  this epistemic 
trend at the onset of  modernity and on its dialectic with alternative approaches. It then 
follows the outcomes of  such contraposition until the present era.
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Quid? Formae ipsae et habitus nonne arguunt ludibria et dedecora deorum uest‑
rorum? (Marcus Minucius Felix, Octavius, 38, 5)
1. Introduction
An ideology of  progress is implicit in the practice of  technology. The do‑
mains of  law and religion are not excluded. In both, the conviction persists 
178  Massimo Leone
that a different arrangement of  technical signs is able to grant better access 
to an invisible realm: on the one hand, religions fine–tune liturgies with the 
certitude that a change in words, gestures, architectures, and other sensori‑
al devices shall lead to a shortening of  the metaphysical distance between 
immanence and transcendence, between the community and the divinity; 
on the other hand, legal systems adopt increasingly sophisticated strategies 
and tools so as to look into the truth of  human life and its legal predica‑
ment. Ideologies of  technological improvement, however, are seldom neu‑
tral, and often introduce a dimension of  bias, a polarization between two or 
more abstract polarities of  signification. In the present paper I explore one 
of  these polarities, which affects the domain of  law, that of  religion, and, 
more generally, the gnoseological approach of  human cultures to the invisi‑
ble. Modernity seems to consist in the more and more pervasive spreading of  
a quantitative prejudice, according to which “seeing more” is equivalent to 
“seeing better”. From the genesis of  modern anatomy in the late Renaissance 
until the development of  extremely sophisticated machines for the analysis 
of  “visual big data”, such prejudice suggests that religious, legal, and other 
representations linking the visible and the invisible gain a firmer grasp on 
their object and, as a consequence, agency by simply increasing the quantity 
of  items that are included into the sensorial scope, and by merely subjecting 
these items to a sort of  computation. In the paper I seek to relativize this 
ideological turn through focusing on early objections to it, essentially deriv‑
ing from two sources: on the one hand, philosophers like Thomas Browne, 
yielding to a sort of  mystical reading of  nature in contrast with the empirical 
and diagrammatic perusal of  it promoted by coeval rationalist philosophers; 
on the other hand, artists like Rembrandt, casting an ironic meta–gaze on the 
gaze of  anatomy so as to downplay its epistemological buoyancy and under‑
line, on the opposite, the virtue of  the painter’s gaze.
2. Ideologies of Transparency and Opacity
Throughout the paper, I shall explore a dialectics between two kinds of  op‑
tical ideologies: a visual rhetoric of  transparency, whose social and political 
counterpart is a hierarchy of  control; and an opposite visual rhetoric of  opac‑
ity, which tends to spot fallacies in the former so as to subvert its strategy 
of  optical control. In simpler, more evocative words, and from a historical 
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point of  view, I shall deal with that which could be defined, with a slight‑
ly tongue–in–cheek expression, the “jealousy of  visual media”: every time 
that, in history, societies develop and adopt more perfected means of  visual 
representation and, therefore, control of  the environment, previous and less 
efficient visual media can be referred to so as to build a metaphor of  social 
liberation. This dialectics between transparent and opaque media, in which 
transparency and opacity are always relative to the specific media at stake, 
inevitably affects the domain of  law.
Legal systems customarily intertwine the epistemological dimension and 
the optical one (Resnik 2004). All senses can be important in the construction 
of  a legal judgment, yet none of  them is as prominent as sight. A sometimes 
naïve visual rhetoric permeates the entire history of  law, a rhetoric accord‑
ing to which seeing better is tantamount to becoming closer to truth. This 
connection between visually grasping the environment and cognitively con‑
trolling the relations between causes and effects in it is deeply and cross–cul‑
turally rooted in legal anthropology (Marrani 2011). Legal societies, however, 
show an enormous range of  variation as regards the particular definition of  
“ seeing better ” that they adopt. The effort of  elaborating a categorization of  
these ideologies of  optical and, therefore, epistemological excellence has not 
been fully undertaken yet.
An important divide across such categorization is that between quanti‑
tative and qualitative optical utopias. On the one side, societies and, hence, 
their legal systems adhere to the idea that encompassing a larger quantity 
of  objects in the visual scope will result in more apt assessing of  the visual 
and legal scene. During the campaign preceding recent Italian administrative 
elections, a right–wing Turin candidate had as a key point of  his program 
installing “ one security camera for every condominium ”, as his political man‑
ifestos would loudly promise. Quantitative ideologies of  visual excellence al‑
ways tend to end up advocating a panopticon. Against such utopia of  “seeing 
it all, ergo, seeing it better”, contrasting ideologies propend for a more se‑
lective visual exploration of  reality. From a certain point of  view, the dialec‑
tics between these two approaches can be juxtaposed with the one opposing 
smooth and striated spaces in Deleuze and Guattari’s famous philosophical 
topology (1980).
Quantitative optical utopias are inclined to implicitly believe in a mono–
dimensional model of  space, which can, therefore, be perused without en‑
visaging any insurmountable obstacles. In technological terms, the combi‑
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nation of  a panoptical ambition with a smooth environment topology often 
gives rise to delusions of  total automatizing. Societies that embrace this kind 
of  utopia invest important cognitive and also economic resources in engi‑
neering all sort of  automatic eyes, able to scan the environment in a way that 
would be precluded to organic sight.
On the other side, though, qualitative ideologies of  optical excellence sug‑
gest, often in a contrastive, dialectical relation to quantitative views, that the 
visual environment is not smooth but striated. In particular, they are keen on 
positing a multi–dimensional model of  the social space, as a consequence of  
which what matters is not to scan reality but to acquire the ability to navi‑
gate across the various layers of  it. If  quantitative explorations of  a smooth 
topology bring about automatic utopias, qualitative meandering through a 
striate topology results in extolling that which could be called “metaphorical 
utopias”: what matters is not to see it all, but to see behind it all.
Needless to say, humanities and especially semiotics are almost naturally 
inclined to endorse the second kind of  visual and also legal understanding 
of  the environment. The primary object itself  of  the discipline, that is, the 
sign, is actually a theoretical hymn to the conviction that there is always a 
“something else” behind the “something”, and that this “something else” can 
never be accessed directly but only through the somehow mysterious and 
unfathomable mediation of  a third element, for instance, the interpretant in 
Peirce’s semiotics.
3. Transparent and opaque anatomy
Positing this dialectics is perhaps not as relevant as pinpointing the passages 
marking the transitions between them, passages in which tensions and tor‑
sions arise in a collectivity’s ways of  looking, representing, and judging. A 
fundamental step in the construction of  the modern visual ideology has been 
constituted by the birth of  anatomical science. Anatomical investigation had 
been performed since antiquity, and had reached an extraordinary level of  
sophistication in the Renaissance. Yet, even one of  the greatest masters of  it, 
that is, Leonardo da Vinci, although offering to posterity paramount insights 
in this field, still associated the exploration of  the body with the pictorial 
representation of  it. The best way to know what was inside a corpse was 
not only dissecting it, and looking through it, but also turning this pragmat‑
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ic, haptic, and optic experience into an inevitably subjective representation. 
Constructing the syntagm of  knowledge as based on both dissecting and 
drawing meant seeking to reconcile two apparently opposite semiotic move‑
ments: on the one hand, the analytical decomposition of  the corpse, so as to 
turn its striated topology into a smooth field of  visual and surgical perusal; 
on the other hand, the synthetic re–composition of  the body, so as to pass 
from the three–dimensional smoothness of  its dissection to the bi–dimen‑
sional striatedness of  its representation.
The birth of  anatomy as modern science coincided with the breaking of  
this equilibrium between analysis and synthesis, dissection and representa‑
tion. 17th–century anatomical treatises are still lavishly illustrated, as present–
day handbooks of  anatomy are. Yet, an epistemological abyss seems to divide 
Leonardo from Andreas van Wesel: in modern and contemporary anatomy, 
images do not artistically recompose the dissected corpse but offer a mere 
rendering of  its verbal articulation. If  in Renaissance anatomy one still wit‑
nesses the transition from the indexes of  disarticulation to the icons of  rep‑
resentation, in modern anatomy icons do not directly transpose the body but 
illustrate the symbolical and, therefore, standardized verbal articulation of  it.
As was suggested at the onset of  this paper, skepticism toward this new 
visual rhetoric of  truth first materializes under the form of  “media jealousy”. 
Whereas displays of  anatomical achievements attain great popular success 
and gain widespread acclaim, those who refrain from partaking in the gener‑
al enthusiasm are exactly the heralds of  a previous modality of  visual explo‑
ration of  the body: painters. Facing the visual and epistemological arrogance 
of  the new science of  the body, the old art of  the body skeptically wonders: 
is this really the best way to look at things? Is it the best way to know things? 
Is it the best way to judge over things? Isn’t there perhaps a mystery, with‑
in the body, in its folds, in its consubstantially striated topology, that only 
the indirect, oblique, and metaphorical gaze of  the painter can attain? These 
questions are particularly thorny when anatomy, as it was soon the case since 
its modern inception as science, turns into an instrument of  legal knowledge, 
assessment, and judgment: is it possible to infer a visual truth from the dissec‑
tion of  a corpse, if  this corpse is not visually and also artistically recomposed 
into a body, into the relic of  a living individuality?
The dialectics between old, artistic anatomy and new, scientific anatomy 
transposes at the level of  representation a more abstract epistemological oppo‑
sition between universality and singularity. If  painters like Leonardo dissected 
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generic corpses in order to subsequently recompose them, through drawing 
and above all through painting, into the singularity of  a represented body, anat‑
omists like Andreas van Wesel would, inversely, draw individual bodies in order 
to visually render the objective universality of  human anatomy. The disappear‑
ing of  color from most 17th–century anatomical drawings is certainly due to 
the technicalities of  the history of  printing, but it also befits a visual ideology 
according to which anatomical engravings must not, like painters, “resurrect” 
a body through the color of  an incarnate but simply propose an iconic translit‑
eration of  the scientific anatomy’s verbal knowledge.
4. The jealousy of Rembrandt
In no early modern visual work is the skeptical “media jealousy” of  painters 
towards anatomists more provocatively visible than in Rembrandt’s1 famous 
Anatomy Lesson of  Dr. Nicolaes Tulp (Figure 1).
On January 16, 1632, in the Waagebouw of  Amsterdam, the famous 
Dutch surgeon Nicolaes Tulp2 executed the public dissection of  the corpse 
of  Adriaan Adriaanszoon, alias Aris Kindt, a 41–year old robber who had just 
been hanged. The dissection was part of  the public lesson of  anatomy year‑
ly offered by the Amsterdam guild of  surgeons. Doctors, anatomy students, 
scholars from several countries, as well as curious citizens attended the show, 
sitting on the benches of  the circular tribune.
The dead body of  Aris Kindt, its dissection, and the surgeon who executed 
it would have been soon forgotten, hadn’t Rembrandt, then aged twenty–
six, immortalized them through depicting them in one of  his most famous 
and enigmatic paintings, presently at the Mauritshuis Museum at the Hague. 
Reams of  paper have been used so as to unveil the mystery of  this canvas, in 
which a detail, in particular, has attracted the still unsatisfied curiosity of  art 
historians, philosophers, and simple spectators: the left hand of  the corpse, 
whose tendons one sees exposed up to the forearm by Dr. Tulp’s forceps, has 
been wrongly represented: judging from the disposition of  the hand bones, 
indeed, one would say it was a right hand (Koolbergen 1992; Ijpma et al. 2006; 
Jackowe et al. 2007; Masquelet 2011).
1. Rembrant Harmenszoon van Rijn, Leiden, Dutch Republic (now the Netherlands), 15 July 
1606 — Amsterdam, Dutch Republic (now the Netherlands), 4 October 1669 (aged 63).
2. Claes Pieterszoon; Amsterdam, 9 October 1593 —The Hague, 12 September 1674.
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The hermeneutic fantasy of  interpreters burst at the sight of  this corpse 
with two right hands, as it bursts any time that an unexpected double shows 
in the image (Heidegger docet; Leone 2012). The hypothesis of  a mistake due 
to the painter’s ignorance has been immediately discarded: Rembrandt was 
an infallible specialist in matters of  human anatomy (O’Bryan 2005: 64–7); 
furthermore, it would be hard to believe that such a coarse ignorance of  the 
discipline could find place in a painting supposed to celebrate it. What is, 
therefore, the meaning of  this monstrosity?
It is striking that such radical a gap manifests itself  between the gaze of  
the implicit observer of  the image — the gaze that the painting predisposes 
thanks to Rembrandt’s pictorial mastery — and the gazes of  the observers 
represented as “ simulacra ” in the painted scene. Whereas our own gaze is 
supposed to be immediately captured by the detail of  the flayed forearm — 
which attracts us because of  its central position in the visual structure of  the 
scene, because of  the brutality of  the exposition of  flesh, and because of  its 
Figure 1. Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn. 1632. The Anatomy Lesson of  Dr. Nicolaes 
Tulp. 216.5 cm × 169.5 cm (85.2 in × 66.7 in). Oil on canvas. The Hague: Mauritshuis.
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anatomical deformity — the eyes of  the observers within the scene, instead, 
do not even glance at the dissected corpse. It is among them, at the center of  
the scene; they surround it with their own bodies, their gestures, and their 
faces; yet, it remains as though invisible and absent to their eyes.
What are they looking at, then? Dr. Tulp, on the right, does not look at 
the corpse. By his forceps he pulls its skin, cut wide open so as to better un‑
cover its internal mystery, but he does not direct his gaze towards it. Instead, 
his eyes are addressing the audience, not as much the one that is closer to 
him, but rather the crowd of  curious spectators filling the amphitheater all 
around. The four characters on his right — the one with a sheet of  notes in 
his hand as well as the other three bending toward the corpse — do not look 
at it either, neither they reciprocate the gaze of  Dr. Tulp. On the contrary, as 
they stretch their bodies toward the center of  the scene, that is not in order 
to better observe the dissected flesh of  the robber, but in order to better read 
from a volume that Dr. Tulp, during the dissection, keeps well open at the 
feet of  the corpse, a copy of  the De humani corporis fabrica by Andreas van 
Wesel, 1543. No image appears in this big in–folio, but only writing. It is 
precisely on this writing, indeed, that the four characters in the middle of  the 
scene cast their gazes, thus neglecting the corpse under their eyes; it is with 
the lines of  this writing, moreover, that one of  the characters, the farthest 
one, compares his own notes.
As regards the two observers sitting at the left of  the corpse, they con‑
stitute a sort of  diptych, meant to suggest — through the static disparity of  
their gazes and the resemblance of  their visages — the movement of  a single 
man: on the right, he looks at Dr. Tulp’s face; on the left, he turns to the open 
volume. Neither of  them, however, looks at the corpse.
What is the reason for this macroscopic distraction? Why, in an amphi‑
theater filled to capacity with spectators and gazes, during the ritual specta‑
cle of  anatomic dissection that decorticates the corpse of  a hanged robber 
— thus discovering two right hands therein — this killed, open, exposed, 
and monstrous body is left alone, looked at by none, and at the center of  
the scene?
Perhaps, the key to the mystery hides in the posture, the visage, and, above 
all, the gaze of  the character who, standing above the others, looks neither 
at the corpse, at Dr. Tulp, or at the open volume at his side. This character, 
on the contrary, looks at us; he beckons us by a gaze that is simultaneously 
calm and inquisitive. What does it mean, this gaze directed at us, and what 
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does it wonder about our own gaze, about the way in which we, prisoners of  
Rembrandt’s pictorial trap, cast our eyes on the center of  the scene, where 
none of  our simulacra looks at, on the impossible flesh of  a forgotten corpse?
5. Decartes versus Browne
In the first chapter of  Die Ringe des Saturns (The Rings of  Saturn), published 
in 1992, the German writer W.G. Sebald3 subtly suggests some paths for the 
identification of  this character, of  his history, and of  his gaze. An unusual 
work, mixture of  travelogue, biography, philosophical meditation, and many 
genres more, Die Ringe des Saturns opens and develops by an irregular line, 
whose subtle semantic unity deploys in a sibylline manner, as barely visible 
filigree (Leone 2004a and 2004b). A chain of  digression whose logic remains 
mysterious leads Sebald to take an interest in the 17th–century English doctor 
and polymath Thomas Browne4. Sebald surmises that Browne, in a period in 
which he was fascinated by the mysteries of  the human body, probably at‑
tended the anatomy lesson of  Dr. Tulp. The German writer does not identify 
the mysterious character in Rembrandt’s painting with Thomas Browne but 
provides some veiled clues for such identification, whose consequences are 
of  paramount importance for the interpretation of  the painting itself.
The first clue that Sebald offers consists in reminding the reader that an‑
other great scholar probably observed the autopsy of  Aris Kindt in Amster‑
dam: René Descartes5. Why does Sebald mention it in a passage devoted to 
Thomas Browne, a passage that wonders about the presence and the gaze of  
the English scholar in the Waagebouw?
The second clue, narrowly linked with the first one, consists in suggesting 
that, although the precise perspective by which Browne observed the dis‑
section of  the corpse is not for us to know, it might be nevertheless inferred 
from what he wrote about the mysterious white fog that, on November 27, 
1674, fell on ample regions of  England and Holland. According to Browne, as 
Sebald reminds us, this fog was emanating from the hollows of  a corpse that 
had just been dissected; Browne was convinced that, during our lives, such 
fog surrounds our brain when we sleep or dream.
3. Wertach, Germany, 18 May 1944 — Norfolk, England, 14 December 2001.
4. London, 19 October 1605 — Norwich, 19 October 1682.
5. La Haye en Touraine, Kingdom of  France, 31 March 1596 — Stockholm, 11 February 1650.
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A mysterious character who looks at us from a pictorial scene in which 
nobody looks at what we are looking at, that is, the flayed and monstrous 
hand of  a hanged and dissected robber; the presence of  Descartes among 
the spectators of  the autopsy; the presence, among the same spectators, of  
Thomas Browne; the intuition, suggested by the evocation of  the fog, that 
the gaze of  Descartes and that of  Browne are somehow opposed, and that 
both hide among the characters of  Rembrandt’s painting: Sebald proposes 
a literary enigma whose ultimate finality seems to be that of  helping us to 
solve Rembrandt’s pictorial enigma; a sort of  meta–enigma, then. But, again, 
where is the key of  the mystery?
In the following pages, Sebald proposes a new chain of  digressions. The 
fog about which Browne wrote looks to the German author like the fog 
that had blurred his sight because of  the analgesics that he was taking in 
the aftermaths of  a surgical operation. Through the window of  his hos‑
pital room, Sebald could therefore observe the trail of  a plane, realizing 
that the aircraft that had traced them was as invisible as the passengers 
within it: “ Die Maschine an der Spitze der Flugbahn war so unsichtbar wie die 
Passagiere in ihrem Inneren ” (Sebald 2001: 29). This biographic digression, 
apparently random, works in reality as all Sebald’s digressions: it discloses 
a novel perspective on the profound meaning of  the tale. As Sebald won‑
ders on Rembrandt’s painting, and as he speculates on the opposite per‑
spectives by which Thomas Browne and Descartes observed the anatomy 
lesson represented by it, what is at stake is always the same subject: the 
relation between gaze, distance, and knowledge. The characters surround‑
ing Dr. Tulp are close to the object of  their perusal, yet they try to know 
it not through direct observation, but rather by concentrating their gazes 
on writing, probably that of  a treatise of  anatomy. Nevertheless, it is not 
through comparing the writing of  the treatise with the image of  the body 
that these characters develop their knowledge; Rembrandt underlines it in 
a very — almost ironically — clear way: one of  them compares the teach‑
er’s writing to his own, to the writing of  his notes; the other three compare 
the writing of  the teacher to his word; however, none of  them looks at the 
corpse, none of  them compares his writing to the flesh.
Therefore, here is the way in which the beckoning gaze that the mysteri‑
ous character whom Sebald identifies with Thomas Browne casts on us could 
be interpreted: we are not like the bystanders of  the dissection; thanks to the 
mediation of  the painting, it is not simply writing that we observe; however, 
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we do not observe the corpse either; rather, we look at the pictorial image 
of  it. And what do we discover in it? What can we detect in it, that the gaze 
of  both anatomy and anatomists could not discover therein? The answer 
is both simple and terrible: what we discover in it is an exception. As many 
other great early modern polymaths, Thomas Browne was obsessed with 
the central questions of  epistemology: what can be known? What cannot be 
known? And what distance, what gaze should be adopted so as to pass from 
ignorance to knowledge? Thomas Browne’s epistemology, Sebald points out, 
develops in a paradoxical way. On the one hand, like many scholars of  his 
epoch, Browne contributes to the development of  the new sciences through 
seeking to bring about a unitary system of  knowledge (Leone 2010). The 
British scholar never fails, hence, to find in the flabbergasting variety of  na‑
ture some constant configurations, whose detection and description can lead 
to a deciphering of  reality, of  both nature and culture.
In The Garden of  Cyrus, published in 1658, Browne is convinced that he 
has found one of  the secret models that constitute reality in the quincunx, a 
disposition of  five elements that he considers a sign of  “ the wisdom of  God ” 
(Leone 2005). He finds it everywhere: in the disposition of  trees in the garden 
of  Cyrus — whence the title of  Browne’s work; in some crystal formations; 
in sea stars and sea urchins; in the vertebrae of  mammals; in the backbone 
of  fishes and birds; in the skin of  several species of  reptiles; in the footprints 
of  quadrupeds that ambulate obliquely; in the body configurations of  cater‑
pillars, butterflies, silk worms; in the root of  water ferns; in the shell of  sun‑
flower seeds and parasol pines; in the heart of  young chestnut burgeons or 
in horsetail stems; and also in human works, such as the Egyptian pyramids 
and Augustus’s mausoleum, or the garden of  Solomon with its pomegranate 
trees and its lilies planted in mathematical order. Browne dreams of  reducing 
the entire reality — nature and culture — to a single mathematical formula, 
to a diagram that, in its extreme simplicity, can nevertheless explain the gen‑
eration and appearance of  it all.
Nevertheless, after following to its extreme this dream of  geometrization 
of  reality, Browne radically changes register. By a typical twist of  his thought 
and prose, he writes that the constellation of  Hyades, the quincunx of  the 
sky, already disappears beyond the horizon, “ and so it is time to close the 
five ports of  knowledge. We are unwilling to spin out our thoughts into the 
phantasms of  sleep, making cables of  cobwebs and wilderness of  handsome 
groves ” (Browne 1669: 70).
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In Thomas Browne, indeed, the ambition of  uncovering the secret reg‑
ularities of  the universe, so as to be able to decrypt its ultimate meaning, 
coexists, in a typically baroque way, with an opposite passion, that for the 
exceptional, the irregular, and the monstrous. In the work entitled Paradoxia 
Epidermica — whose first edition dates from 1646, the fifth and last from 1672 
— Browne focuses precisely on this subject: he wonders about the reality, or 
about the fiction, of  monstrous beings, found or imagined during centuries 
of  human history. Somehow anticipating Borges’s6 Libro de los seres imaginar-
ios [book of  imaginary beings], Browne takes an interest in the chameleon, 
in the salamander, in the ostrich, in the griffin, in the phoenix, in the basilisk, 
in the unicorn, in the amphisbaena. Moreover, he keeps in his laboratory a 
Eurasian bittern, whose cry as deep as that of  a bassoon fascinates him.
Browne searches for the regularities of  the universe, for the geometrical 
principles of  its secret structure, and at the same time he never stops search‑
ing and collecting pathologies, exceptions, and monstrosities that, in nature 
or in human invention, transform this geometry, disfigure it, and introduce 
chaos and unintelligibility in such order (Leone 2014).
Given this dichotomy between the “ geometrization of  nature and culture ” 
and the “ search for monstrosity ” — a dichotomy that is typical of  Browne’s 
scientific works and characterizes those of  many of  his contemporaries — 
what is, then, the relation of  this dichotomy with those masterfully evoked 
by Rembrandt in his pictorial representation of  Dr. Tulp’s anatomy lesson: 
“ gaze on the corpse ” versus “ gaze on writing ”; Descartes versus Browne; etc.? 
And, even more importantly in this context, what is the relation between 
these oppositions and the dialectics of  optical ideologies sketched at the be‑
ginning of  the paper?
6. Beyond the microscope
The earliest recorded working refracting telescope appeared in the Neth‑
erlands in 1608. Also in the Netherlands, the first compound microscope 
appeared by the 1620s, less than a decade before the hanging of  Adriaan 
Adriaanszoon, the public dissection of  his corpse by Dr. Nicolaes Tulp, and 
their depiction in Rembrandt’s painting. First in Amsterdam, then in the rest 
6. Jorge Francisco Isidoro Luis Borges, Buenos Aires, 24 August 1899 — Geneva, 14 June 1986.
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of  Europe, the eye and the hand of  the painter were challenged not only by 
optical instruments able to look into the infinitely far and into the infinitely 
close, but also by an optical technique, autopsy, promising to reveal the se‑
crets of  the body with no impediments. “ Media jealousy ” — in the contrapo‑
sition between the old visual technique and the new ones — prompts paint‑
ing to elaborate a rhetoric of  opacity, contrasting the rhetoric of  transpar‑
ence incarnated in the new scientific usage of  lenses and scalpels. Challenged 
in his visual primacy, Rembrandt reclaims the dignity of  his art by organizing 
an ironic visual scene, in which anatomists are so confident in their scientific 
optics that they literally forget to look at the corpse, while the painter organ‑
izes the representation of  it so that we, its observers, cannot miss that which 
the anatomists so ridiculously overlook: this corpse has two right hands. It is 
a lesson of  singularity opposed to the universal claims of  anatomy, but it is 
also a moral lesson (Leone 2013): Rembrandt’s painting is implicitly suggest‑
ing that it is only by looking into the complex folds of  human individuality 
through the metaphorical, striated gaze of  painting — rather than through 
the smooth, automatic look of  autopsy — that the truthful secret of  the body 
will be discovered. Opposing, as Sebald points out in The Rings of  Saturn, the 
smooth epistemology of  the Cartesian diagrammatics, and endorsing, on the 
opposite, the labyrinthine epistemology of  Browne’s ballet with order and 
chaos, Rembrandt discovers that this robber, hanged few hours earlier, bru‑
tally dissected by the Amsterdam anatomists, and obscenely exposed in their 
arrogant display of  new optical power, in reality had no left hand, the hand 
traditionally associated with evil, sin, and guilt. The moral judgment that the 
painting passes on the life of  this body therefore subverts the adjudication of  
the panoptical law, discovering the intrinsic innocence of  humanity where 
anatomists, microscopes, and the automatisms of  law had only found devia‑
tion and culpability.
7. Conclusions
In this paper I have proposed a complex, sometimes even tortuous path across 
several epochs, disciplines, practices of  representations, and epistemological 
domains. This path can be summarized as a plea for singularity; for attention 
towards singularity. The technological progress of  devices of  representation 
and control in both religion and law promises to bestow upon their users an 
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increasingly perfected mastery of  the real, conceived as a collection of  items 
on which direct and computable agency can be exerted. In the domain of  
law, the discourse of  technicians swerves more and more towards an imagi‑
nary of  cold revelation, in which the patient accumulation of  data and their 
quantitative treatment lay the ultimate truth of  human nature bare. The 
contemporary religious discourse too does not escape this ideology. Beyond 
spiritual differences, indeed, the digital versions of  all present–day religions 
seem to stress the preponderance of  accountability: counting one’s sins, one’s 
prayers, calculating festive dates and arranging the bureaucracy of  faith ap‑
pears as more important than igniting the risky duel between the singularity 
of  an existence and its spiritual counterparts. Even more disquietingly, the 
digital casing itself  of  reality seems to turn into a sort of  new spiritual credo, 
uncritically embraced by human communities across the globe and revolving 
around the belief  that computational representation is tantamount to knowl‑
edge or, worse, morality. Every domain of  representation today is inexorably 
prey to such demons of  digital calculus, to a semiotic ideology that, inaugu‑
rated by early modern optical science, advocates for an orderly exploration 
of  the human predicament, until its secret is turned into the tetragon struc‑
tures of  a diagram. The humanities must not deny the triumphal emergence 
of  this attitude but must not blindly endorse it either. Recuperating alter‑
native genealogies of  the gaze from mystical philosophers, ironic painters, 
and visionary writers might, indeed, work as an antidote against an excessive 
rigidity of  the representation, a rigidity that, by compressing the singularity 
of  life into quantifiable grids, paradoxically risks losing track of  that which is 
at the core itself  of  the modern understanding of  reality, that is, the treasure 
of  individuality.
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